Leaked files raise fears over safety of Shell oil production fleet, years after devastating spill
A large oil spill in 2011 from a floating oil production vessel off the coast of Nigeria, known as the Bonga, was one of the worst there in a decade
Off the coast of Nigeria, one of the world’s largest oil production ships, called the Bonga, was taking oil from a field on the ocean floor and transferring it to a tanker ship. Such transfers are routine in the offshore oil industry, but something went wrong on the Bonga, owned by energy giant Shell.
A major leak began in one of the lines that connected the two vessels. Over the next three hours, the crew detected that more oil was being pumped from the ship than the tanker was receiving. Another hour passed before an oily sheen was spotted on the water. An hour after that, the crew member in charge of the fueling shut off the flow.
By then, about 40,000 barrels of oil had escaped into the Atlantic Ocean, according to an English High Court evaluation, making the December 2011 incident one of Nigeria’s worst spills in a decade. At the height of the spill, an oil slick spread over 685 square miles (1,776 square kilometers), twice the size of New York City. Nigerian regulators later fined the subsidiary Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCo) $3.6 billion, an amount being appealed today.
Now a confidential review of Shell’s fleet of production ships, obtained by The Associated Press, plus internal company safety surveys and interviews with two whistleblowers, show that as recently as three years ago — almost 11 years after the Bonga spill — there were safety issues with the fleet, including the Bonga. The 2022 review found fault with the same systems involved in the Bonga spill. The whistleblowers said the problems risk another Bonga-type disaster.
Oil production ships like the Bonga are a critical part of the offshore oil industry. Often permanently moored in one location, they take oil from wells on the ocean floor and transfer it to tankers.
The 2022 review of the Bonga was an attempt to address maintenance and safety problems in Shell’s oil production ship flotilla. It was authored by Shell senior maritime auditor Zubair Ali Khan. It found issues on several ships, ranging from corrosion to bad upkeep and poor firefighting systems, and cited a “lack of clear and established standards and processes.”
For example, the report noted “continuously deficient" systems for oil transfer and firefighting and lifesaving equipment. Oil transfer systems are what had failed in the massive 2011 spill, and in 2022, the problems on the Bonga with oil transfer systems were deemed “high risk.” Replying to a LinkedIn message, Khan declined to comment.
Tony Cox, an accident investigator with decades of experience in the offshore oil industry, said it was concerning that transfer problems persisted on the Bonga 11 years after the giant spill given that transfers are a “recognized hazard” and “well known to be a potential point of spillage.”
A Shell spokesman said by email that the company's safety record was continuously improving. Serious accidents aboard this ship have gone down from one per year on average to zero since 2018, Shell said, with less serious incidents reduced by 70% and spills by 90% since 2020. A total of 369 pieces of critical safety equipment were not in satisfactory condition in 2014, the spokesman said, dropping to two last year.
Shell did not respond when asked if all the recommendations in the report were adopted.
Beyond the Bonga ship, the 2022 internal safety report said there were other “recurring incidents.”
The report described “severe corrosion” in pipes and protective barriers around oil tanks in the vessel Fluminense, off Brazil.
Two workers were left “with moderate to severe burns” after an incident on a vessel off the U.S. coast in 2016.
There were “degraded facilities” on the gas-producing ship Prelude anchored off Australia, where fire broke out in 2021. In 2023, more than a year after the safety report, problems on the Prelude persisted, according to Australian regulators who found health and safety violations related to “exposure to chemicals and risk of an explosion.” They ordered improvements.
In the case of the Prelude, Shell said a dedicated local team of safety engineers and experts looked after the vessel but didn't provide more details.
Other incidents have been reported by regulators or in the press. For example, another Shell ship off Nigeria, the Sea Eagle, began to take on seawater in 2022 and needed urgent repairs, something Cox said was highly unusual for floating production vessels.
The company is currently in the midst of a wrongful dismissal lawsuit with a former employee, a safety engineer from London, whom Shell said was fired for poor performance. An interim court ruling leaned toward Shell's argument and a Shell spokesman said the company is “clear about the merits of our case."
The former employee, Irina Woodhead, advised on safety standards aboard the Prelude. She said that in the 2021 fire incident off Australia, safety systems didn’t activate. Seven people had to seek medical treatment for heat exhaustion, Shell said. Woodhead said she blew the whistle on safety failings and was fired for doing so.
“One mistake can cost a lot of lives,” Woodhead said, and a future disaster is “absolutely” possible. “If you don’t maintain that equipment, that’s when the fires happen, that’s when the explosions happen.”
Regarding the Fluminense, off Brazil, a Shell spokesman said it identified problems, shut down production and took the vessel out of service. In the case of the Sea Eagle, off Nigeria, the spokesman said Nigerian regulators were promptly informed of the leak and it was swiftly repaired. The incident that left two workers with burns off the coast of the U.S. in 2016 isn't reflective of the company's overall safety culture, he said.
Similar issues were raised in safety surveys carried out by statistician Caroline Dennett, a former Shell consultant. Beginning in 2012, she surveyed thousands of Shell workers on the company's safety culture. She quit in 2022 over Shell's climate policies and became an activist.
The surveys measured employees' perception of performance in 10 areas, including maintenance, communication and safety awareness. Surveys obtained by AP of 97, 159 and 128 workers on the Bonga, done in 2012, 2014 and 2021 respectively, show that employees' views of company performance overall dropped in nine categories.
The Bonga was problematic “from day one," said Dennett, citing a lack of manpower, difficulty getting spare parts and falling standards.
“The fear was getting more severe over time as skilled personnel were not replaced,” she added.
The surveys also invited workers aboard the vessel to make their own comments. Based on these, in 2014, Dennett was concerned enough to write to a Shell manager, flagging worker fears that Bonga was a “keg of gunpowder” and in “impending peril,” with everyone on it “at risk.” The manager promised to act.
The next year, a leaked memo by the operational safety team for Nigeria said the need for “drastic improvements” was shown by the 2012 survey. They were also “worried” by the “thought provoking” 2014 survey, which had worse results.
In an email, Shell said safety has improved on the Bonga since the 2012 and 2014 surveys, when a worker described it as a powder keg.
Still, as recently as 2021, some 59% of workers on the Bonga thought maintenance needed either a lot of or some improvement. Another 3% said it was failing outright. Only 28% of team leaders felt positively about the levels of maintenance the company performed on its equipment. A majority, 57%, were concerned about the level of resources and expertise on the vessel.
In response, the company noted that more than 90% of those surveyed in 2021 felt positive about another category measured, the Bonga’s safety processes, and the overwhelming majority felt comfortable speaking out about problems.
Internal emails seen by AP show Shell safety experts and lawyers had agreed that if 10% of workers thought a safety category was failing or needed considerable improvement, it would be considered “legally critical.” The issue would then need to be resolved within 18 months. If that figure hit 20%, it would be urgent with a one-year deadline. The negative responses about the Bonga more than passed these thresholds.
But the company later eliminated these commitments, according to an email seen by AP. “This steer comes from legal,” Shell health and safety advisor Bradd McCaslin wrote to another Shell safety manager in 2018. After that date, the thresholds disappeared from surveys reviewed by AP.
Safety reviews don’t work if people don’t make the suggested improvements, said safety expert Cox.
McCaslin did not respond to LinkedIn messages from AP seeking comment.
In internal correspondence from 2012, also seen by AP, Shell’s U.S. operations chose not to use the surveys at all after a lawyer raised “legal liability concerns.” The company said its common practice for legal teams to advise on processes, and it doesn't fall to just one team to direct how risk is managed.
Rich Howe, Shell's vice president for deep water operations, said a “relentless focus on safety” was “deeply ingrained in the Shell culture,” and its standards are “widely recognized across the sector.”
“These documents are evidence of that culture," said Howe, speaking of the surveys and safety report. “A company which is continually looking to strengthen safety performance by proactively seeking out problems or concerns that can then be addressed.”
___
The Associated Press’ climate and environmental coverage receives financial support from multiple private foundations. AP is solely responsible for all content. Find AP’s standards for working with philanthropies, a list of supporters and funded coverage areas at AP.org
